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FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE: RESTRICTIVE
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION I404(a) ADOPTED
BY SUPREME COURT
SECTION 1404(a) of the Judicial Code provides that "for the con-
venience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district
court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division
where it might have been brought."' In Hoffman v. Blaski,2 a patent
infringement action, and in S&llivan v. Behimer,3 a stockholders' deriva-
tive suit, the respective defendants sought transfer to districts where the
suits could not have been initiated .because venue would have been
improperly laid 4 and service of process unavailable.' In each case the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to permit transfer on
the grounds that the words "where it might have been brought"
limited transfer to districts where the suit could have been initiated with-
out the defendants' consent. Specifically, the court held that the de-
fendants could not secure transfer to the districts of their choice by
waiving venue and process defects.
The Supreme Court affirmed this interpretation of the statute, three
Justices dissenting.6 The opinion of the Court asserts that violence
'28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958).
2 26o F.2d 317 ( 7 th Cir. z959). The action had been brought in the District
Court for the Northern District of Texas, which granted the defendants' motion to
transfer. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to grant a writ of
mandamus vacating the transfer order. Ex parte Blaski, 245 F.2d 737 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 872 (1957). In the receiving district, the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, plaintiff moved to "remand" the action to the Northern
District of Texas, and, on denial of the motion, petitioned the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit for a writ of mandamus reversing the order.
3 261 F.zd 467 (7 th Cir. 1958). The District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois had granted the defendants' motion to transfer. The plaintiffs then petitioned
for mandamus directing vacation of the transfer order.
"Venue in patent infringement litigation is provided for in z8 U.S.C. § 14oo(b)
(958); venue provisions governing actions against corporations are found in z8 U.S.C.
§ 39-(c) 0958).
'FFD. R. Civ. P. 4 (f).
* Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (196o) (cases consolidated). The dissenters con-
sidered the cases separately. In Blaski they looked beyond the parties' stipulations and
contended that considerations appurtenant to res judicata precluded the Seventh Circuit's
re-examination of the Fifth Circuit's decision that transfer was proper. For discussion
of the propriety of petitions for special writs as a means of gaining appellate review
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would be done to an unequivocal statute if transfer to a district where
the plaintiff did not originally "have a right" to bring suit were
allowed.7  Further, if transfer to any district were to follow upon de-
fendants' Nwaiver of venue and process objections, plaintiffs, having no
comparable privilege, would be discriminated against. The basis of
the decision, however, is the Court's analysis that transferor courts have
no-power to transfer unless the action "might have been brought" in
the receiving- district8 and that a transferee district has no jurisdiction
unless the action was validly transferred.
In a comprehensive dissent in the Sullivan case, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, argues that the statutory words are not unequivocal, citing the
wide range of interpretation given them by lower courts. In his view,
additionally, discrimination in any meaningful sense would not result
from a liberal interpretation of the statute, since the interests of all
parties are considered in determining whether the alternative forum will
better serve convenience and justice; rather than discriminating against
plaintiffs, a broad construction would merely temper their discriminatory
choice-of-forum advantageY The dissent also points out that syllogistic
analysis of, the transferor court's power offers no help in determining
where the action "might have been brought," for the determination is
one. of, the locale where a lawsuit can conveniently be heard, not of the
power of courts. Finally, because convenience itself is primarily at
is ue, the parties should be permitted to waive rules generally designed
for their benefit when adherence to those rules proves inconvenient.
'Ii any even, -a liberal interpretation of words that are concededly a
;f tr bisfer orders, see In re Josephson, 218 F.zd 174. (st Cir. 1954), and Magnetic
Eng1r & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., 178 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1950).
: ;363"'f.S. at 344. The dissent criticizes this use of a verbal formula not found
In" the l'p1'ain" words of the statute. Id. at 358.
*Accoid,"Fettig Canning Co. v. Steckler, 188 F.zd 715 ( 7 th Cir.), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 951 (x951) i Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 107 F. Supp. 51 (W.D. Wash.
195:i) United States'v. ix Cases, etc., 94 F. Supp. 9z5 (D. Ore. 195o) (question
;considered to'be bn of power).
The determination is clearly one of the power of the court in cases where jurisdic-
tion"o'ver the sulject matter is involved. For example, in Lucas v. New York Cent.
h.R',' 88 F. Supp." 536 (S.D.N.Y. 195o), the motion to transfer was denied when
diversity of citizenship would have been destroyed by the transfer; in Felchlin v.
American Smelting & Ref. Co., 136 F. Supp. 577 (S.D. Cal. 1955), the motion was
denied where tfie plaifitiff-administrator would have had no standing to sue in the
'receiving district.
"-' 'Jiddge Holtioff has also referred to this aspect of the statute with approval but,
appareni13, within the limititions prescribed by the instant decision. United States v.
'E.I. du'Pont de Nemours & Co.; '83 F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 1949).
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.limitation on, the operation of the statute does not deprive them of
meaning, 10 for defendants would nevertheless be required to waive any
objections to proceeding in the transferee district."
Because the liberal interpretation of section I4O4(a) advocated by
the dissent would induce dilatory use of motions for transfer, 2 an added
burden would be imposed on district judges regardless of their ability
to discern and summarily dispose of spurious motions.' 3 However,
this burden would be mitigated in that liberal interpretation would tend
to relieve congestion in the more "popular" districts.14
'0 See Paramount Pictures v. Rodney, s86 F.2d 111, 116 ( 3 rd Cir. i95o) (dissent),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 953 (i95i)5 General Elec. Co. v. Central Transit Warehouse
Co., 127 F. Supp. 817 (W.D. Mo. i95s). See also 57 MIcH. L. REV. 772 (.959).
"See Frechoux v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., xi8 F. Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), and
Greve v. Gibralter Enterprises, 85 F. Supp. 410 (D.N.M. 1949) (motion used to insure
Waiver of the defense of statute of limitations).
In Sheridan v. Pan American Ref. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), and
Curry v. States Marine Corp., ixiS F. Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), the motions were
-denied when the defendants refused to waive the statute of limitations in the receiving
.districts.
" "The dissent contends that apprehension concerning the possibility of this burden
vexing plaintiffs implies distrust of the competence of the district judges. 363 U.S.
at 368.
- Even,under the strict interpretation, a determination of whether service of process
could have been had on a particular defendant at a particular time could lead to
,burdensome preliminary litigation.
.One district judge recognized the frequent use of the motion for transfer and its
xesultant work load. Kaufman, Observations on Transfer Under Section r4o4(a) of
tie New Judicial Code, o F.R.D. 595 (1951). However, he later concluded that
.the maximum convenience of the parties would be realized by allowing transfer to "the
widest possible choice of forums." Kaufman, Further Observations on Transfers
Under Section 1404(a), 56 COLUM. L. REv. r, 18 (1956).
"To ensure that this preliminary maneuvering remains minimal, it seems desirable
dlat the trial judge's discretion not be usurped by the appellate courts. See Chicago,
R.I. & P. R.R. v. Igoe, 220 F.zd 299, 305 ( 7 th Cir. 1955) (dissent).
.... In this opinion the Supreme Court-did not clarify the use of the special writs to
effect what amounts to an appellate review of an interlocutory order. Compare Clayton
v. Warlick, 232 F.ad 699 (4th Cir. 1956), and In re Josephson, zi F.2d 174 (st
Cir. 1954), th Chicago, R.I. & P.,R.R. v. Igoe, supra.
"'Plaintiffs frequently bring suit in districts noted for large jury verdicts.- Such
districts, usually serving large metropolitan areas, often have congested dockets, a
.condition which itself permits plaintiffs to coerce settlement from defendants appre-
•hensive of long-pending litigation. Thus, a means should exist whereby these cases
,could be transferred to a more apporpriate forum, if one exists. The leading article
.on forum non conveniens suggested the use of that doctrine for this purpose. Blair,
,The Doctrine of Forum.Non Cozzveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV.
1 (1929).
It seems apparent that the patent bar's recognition that. certain districts are more
YpI. ,95: 349]
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Although some of the early interpretations of section 1404(a) are
irreconcilable,'" a discernible pattern seems to have emerged. 6 Plaintiffs
have uniformly been denied transfer unless suit could properly have
been initiated in the transferee district.'7  Defendants, on the other
hand, have been granted transfer to districts where they could have
resisted suit, on the theory that a motion for transfer waives any objec-
tions the defendant may have had to the receiving district.' 8  Most of
these decisions involved several defendants, at least one of whom was
amenable to suit in the transferee district," but this factor was not always
considered to be determinative." Prior to the Blaski decision in the
Seventh Circuit, the trend apparently was toward a liberal interpre-
favorable to the holder of the patent in infringement actions was a major concern in
the preliminary skirmishing displaying in the Blaski litigation. 57 MIcH. L. REV.
772, 774 n. x6 (1958). The problem of transferring patent litigation when the
alternative districts display conflicting decisions was considered in Clayton v. Warlick,
supra note 13.
"'Coz pare Otto v. Hirl, 89 F. Supp. 7z (S.D. Iowa 195o) (plaintiff allowed
transfer to district where defendant not amenable to process), 'with Barnhart v. John
B: Rogers Prod. Co., 86 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Ohio 1949 ) (statute held not applicable
to plaintiffs). Compare Sheridan v. Pan American Ref. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 8
(S.D.N.Y. 1954) (defendant denied transfer to a district in which venue was im-
proper), and Silbert v. Nu-Car Carriers, xit F. Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (de-
fendant denied transfer to district in which he was not amenable to process), with
Hill v. Upper Mississippi Towing Corp., i4x F. Supp. 692 (D. Minn. 1956), and
Welch v. Esso Shipping Co., viz F. Supp. 6xi (S.D.N.Y. 5953) (defendants allowed
transfer to districts in which they were not amenable to process and in which venue
was improper).
1" See Comment, Change of Venue in Federal Courts: New Restrictions Upon Choice
of Transferee Forum, 54 Nw. U.L. REV. 489 (i959), which also criticizes the de-
cisions of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the instant cases.
"'E.g., Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, x81 F.zd 949 (2d Cir. 1950). Contra,
Troy v. Poorvu, 132 F. Supp. 864 (D. Mass. 1955), interpreting In re Josephson,
ziS F.zd 174 (st Cir. 1954).
28 E.g., Ex parte Blaski, z45 F.zd 737 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 87z(0957).
'
9 Anthony v. Kaufman, 193 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 955
(95z); Paramount Pictures v. Rodney, 186 F.2d xii ( 3 d Cir. 595o), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 953 0951)-
In Continenial Grain Co. v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 364 U.S. 19 (196o), 6o
COLUM. L. Rav. 1035 (i96o), an in rem action was held to be transferable because
the owner of'the res, also named as a defendant, was amenable to suit in the transferee
district. Justices Frankfurter and Harlin concurred on the basis of their dissent in
Blaski, and Justices Whittaker and Douglas dissented, contending the Blaski decision
was controlling because the in rem action could have been brought only in that dis.
trict in which the res was located.
S'E.g., In re Josephson, z8 F.2d 174 (ist Cir. 1954).
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tation."1  Indeed, the Seventh Circuit's decision represents the first
appellate court recognition of the restrictive interpretation finally
adopted by the Supreme Court.
Forum non conveniens, the antecedent of section 1404(a), has been
said to presuppose at least two forums in which the defendant is
amenable to process.- On this assumption it has been argued that
transfer under section I404(a) is limited to districts where the de-
fendant could originally have been sued.23  This argument is vulnerable
in both premise and conclusion, for there are cases under the antecedent
doctrine in which defendants procured dismissal by submitting to suit
in forums where they were originally not subject to suit.24  Further-
more, since the statute is more than a mere codification of forum non
conveniens, 25 the common law requirement of two proper forums is
irrelevant. .n
In support of the majority opinion, it is arguable that the Court's
restriction on defendants' use of the statute is sound, considering the
accepted limitations on plaintiffs' right of transfer.20  To allow de-
fendants to transfer to any district, while restricting plaintiffs to those
districts available under applicable venue and process requirements,
could lead to forum shopping by defendants. It seems questionable
n'General Cas. Co. v. Grubb, 253 F.zd 51 ( 7 th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 907
(x958) ; Ex parte Blaski, 245 F.zd 737 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 872 (x957).
The dissent in Blaski v. Hoffman, 26o F.2d 317 ( 7 th Cir. 1958), points out that a
previous decision in that case, withdrawn on rehearing, had adopted the liberal view.
"Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
23Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R. v. Igoe, 212 F.zd 378 (Tth Cir. 1954) ; Foster-Milburn
Co. v. Knight, xS F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1950). But see In re Josephson, 2x8 F.2d 174,
185 (ist Cir. 1954), where this reasoning is termed a "gloss" on the statute.
2 5 Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 (1932), afflring 49
F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 193); Vargas v. A. H. Bull S.S. Co., 44 N.J. Super. 536, 131
A.2d 39, aff'd per curiam, 25 N.J. 293, 135 A.zd 857 (1957), cert denied, 355 U.S.
958 (x958). "The Scottish Court will only treat itself as forum conveniens when
the foreign trustees are either not liable or not willing to answer in the proper
forum." GIBB, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JURISDICTION 223 (1926). (Emphasis
added.) Contra, Hill v. Upper Mississippi Towing Corp., 252 Minn. 165, 89 N.W.2d
654 (.958).
'5Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955). Compare United States v.
National City Bus Lines, Inc., 337 U.S. 78 (x949), withs United States v. National City
Bus Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 573 (1948) (dismissal under forum non conveniens denied,
but transfer under the statute allowed on same factual situation).
"The applicability of § i4o4(a) to plaintiffs is considered in Korbel, Plaintiff's
Right to Change of Venue in Federal Courts, 38 U. DT. L.J. 137 (196o).
27 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 86.2 (rev. ed.
196o). It has been pointed out, however, that this difficulty would be overcome
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whether the requirement that the transfer be for convenience and in the
interest of justice would be sufficient restraint on this one-sided power
of selection.
If each party to litigation is to be able to present his strongest case,
the most convenient forum should be made available. Rules governing
venue and service of process provide such a forum in a majority of
cases. Inevitably, however, cases will arise in which a party can show
that the specified district is inappropriate. Section 1404(a), broadly
interpreted, would have given federal district judges wide discretionary
power to cope with such situations. Since the statute has not achieved
that end, Congress should undertake its revision. "s
if the statute were as completely applicable to plaintiffs as to defendants. Kaufman,
FurtIzer Observations on Transfers Under Section x404(a), 56 CoLUbi. L, REv. x, iS
(1956). See also 6o YALE L.J. 183 (195).
" The commentators have requested revision of the statute. Kaps, Venue Problems
n'Binkruptcy Proceedings, x4 RUTGERS L. REv. 749 (x 960) ; Keefe, Venue and Retnoval
Jokers in the New Federal Judicial Code, 38 VA. L. REV. 569 (1952) ; Korbel, supi-a
note z6.
